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IN THE SUP·REME COURT 
OF THE STATE O·F UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
MAX LEON REAY, 
Defendant a;nd Appellant. 
NATURE OF CASE 
Case 
No. 9516 
Defendant was convicted of assault with the intent 
to commit robbery and with being a habitual criminal, 
in violation of Sections 76-51-3, U.C.A. 1953 and 76-1-18, 
U.C.A. 1953, respectively, upon trial by jury in the Third 
Judicial District Court on April 5, 1961, and claims that 
the insufficiency of the evidence and other irregularities 
require a reversal of the convictions. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The State of Utah contends the appellant's con vic~ 
tions should be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondent will adopt the appellant's statement 
of facts as being essentially correct, but will supplement 
the facts therein presented where felt necessary in the 
argument portions of its brief. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
PoiNT I. 
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SHOW 
THE DEFENDANT'S IDENTITY AND TO 
SUPPORT THE JURY'S VERDICT. 
PoiNT II. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN GIVING IN-
STRUCTION NO. 4 AND THE DEFENDANT 
HAS WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO COMPLAIN 
BY HIS FAILURE TO EXCEPT TO THE 
INSTRUCTION. 
PoiNT III. 
THE RECORD DOES NOT SHOW THAT THE 
INFORMATION RELATING TO THE HA-
BITUAL CRIMINAL CHARGE WAS READ 
TO THE JURY BEFORE THE ROBBERY 
TRIAL. 
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PoiNT IV. 
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE DEFEND-
ANT'S CONVICTIONS UPON THE CHARGE 
OF BEING AN HABITUAL CRIMINAL. 
ARGUMENT 
PoiNT I. 
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SHOW 
THE DEFENDANT'S IDENTITY AND TO 
SUPPORT THE JURY'S VERDICT. 
The defendant alleges that the evidence at trial was 
insufficient to sustain a conviction of robbery, and com-
plains specifically that there is insufficient evidence of 
record to identify the defendant with the perpetration of 
the crime. The determination of guilt or innocence based 
upon the facts is usually a matter within the sole dis-
cretion of the jury. State v. Green, 78 Utah 580, 6 P. 2d 
177; State v. Harris, 1 U. 2d 182, 264 P. 2d 284, (1953). 
An appellate court should not reverse a conviction unless 
it appears from all the circumstances, when viewed in a 
light most favorable to the verdict, that the verdict was 
unreasonable. State v. Berchtold, 11 U. 208, 357 P. 2d 
183 (1960). The standard to be applied in reviewing the 
instant case on appeal is noted in State v. Ward, 10 U. 2d 
34, 347 P. 2d 865 (1959), where the court said. 
''The rules governing the scope of review on ap-
peal as to the sufficiency of the evidence to sus-
tain the verdict are well settled: that it is the 
prerogative of the jury to judge the credibility 
of the witnesses and to determine the facts; that 
the evidence will be reviewed in the light most 
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favorable to the verdict; and that if when so 
viewed it appears that the jury acting fairly and 
reasonably could find the defendant guilty beyond 
a reasonable doubt, the verdict will not be 
disturbed.'' 
Thus, for defendant to prevail, it must appear from 
the record that the trial judge was unreasonable in 
allowing the jury to pass on the guilt of the defendant, 
and that in finding him guilty the jury acted unreasonably. 
Identity in a robbery or assault with intent to com-
mit robbery case may be proved like any other element 
upon circumstantial evidence, People v. Dodson, 77 CA 
2d 389, 175 P. 2d 59, and it is submitted that the evidence 
in the instant case, when viewed with all its logical infer-
ences in a light most favorable to the verdict, supports 
the conviction. 
The evidence of record shows that on Sunday night, 
September 25, 1960, Ronald R. Eatchel, Assistant Man-
ager of the Safeway Store, located at 370 East South 
Temple in Salt Lake, closed the store at about 7 :05 p.m. 
(R. 25). His wife Donna, had driven the family car to 
the store to pick up her husband. After closing the store 
and padlocking it, he and his wife went to their auto-
mobile that was parked in front of the store some 25 feet 
away (R. 26). At that time, Arthur John Witchey ap-
proached the couple, pulled a gun from his pocket, and 
ordered everyone back to store (R. 27). Mr. Eatchel was 
able to convince Witchey that he couldn't open the store, 
so Witchey and the couple returned to the car of Mr. 
Eatchel (R 29). 
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Eatchel testified that another car was parked behind 
his in which Witchey and another person were riding, 
and which followed Eatchel's car with the lights off down 
Fourth East Street, after the latter refused to open the 
store (R. 30). Eatchel testified that another person in the 
robber's car was on the driver's side of the vehicle (R. 30). 
Thereafter, Mr. and Mrs. Eatchel proceeded in their car 
to the Police Station, where they reported the incident 
(R. 31). Mrs. Eatchel, during the course of the incident, 
was able to get the license number of the vehicle in which 
Witchey and the unidentified person were riding. She 
was also able to identify the color and make of the ve-
hicle (R. 37). Mrs. Eatchel also testified that there was 
another unidentified person in the vehicle that, at the 
time of the incident, was sitting behind the steering 
wheel, and that he might have been the one driving at 
the time they were followed after leaving the store. Mr. 
Eatchel further identified the gun that Witchey was carry-
ing as a .22-caliber pistol. 
At approximately 7:20 p.m. (R. 44), or fifteen min-
utes after the incident of the assault upon Mr. and Mrs. 
Eatchel, Officer Michael C. Clark, a city police officer, ob-
served the vehicle identified and reported by the Eatch-
els, facing east on Fourth South, where it was appre-
hended. The defendant, Max Leon Reay, was then behind 
the driver's wheel of the vehicle, and Arthur Witchey 
'vas on the passenger's side; a .22-caliber revolver was 
also found in the vehicle at the time of apprehension. 
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The only issue is whether, based upon this evidence, 
a jury could reasonably conclude, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that Max Leon Reay was the unidentified occupant 
of the vehicle at the time of the attempted holdup. The 
State submits that a reasonable and proper inference 
can be drawn, that, since it was shown that an unidenti-
fied man was present with the person who assaulted the 
Eatchels in the attempted robbery, assisted Witchey by 
driving the vehicle from the store, and in the short space 
of 15 minutes was apprehended in the same vehicle, oper-
ating the vehicle, accompanied by Witchey, and with a 
.22-caliber pistol in the vehicle, that the unidentified per-
son was Max Leon Reay, and that, therefore, he was the 
accomplice of Witchey. The short passage of time and the 
presence of other factors identified with the commission 
of the crime clearly support such an inference. The jury 
could well feel the defendant's alibi to have been untrue 
and concluded that he had always been present in the 
vehicle. The inference is reasonable under the circum-
stances. The circumstances proved in the instant case are 
clearly consistent with the inferences to be drawn. Carter 
v. Sta;ndard Accident Ins. Co., 65 Utah 465, 238 Pac. 259. 
The defendant's claim that evidence is insufficient 
because of the standard applied in State v. Marasco, 81 
Utah 325, 17 P. 2d 919 (1933), misconstrues the insuffi-
ciency found in that case. In the Marasco case there was 
no factual evidence present at the scene of the commission 
of the crime that was later present with the defendant 
that tended to connect the defendant to the scene of the 
crime. Nor was the time element necessarily conducive 
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to the inference sought to be drawn. In Marasco a mere 
showing of flight plus motive existed. In the instant case, 
three items: Witchey, the .22-caliber pistol, and the auto-
mobile were all found in the presence of the accused in the 
short span of 15 minutes after the event, and it was addi-
tionally shown that Witchey was accompanied by an uni-
dentified person, which person was in the driver's seat, 
where the defendant was at the time of apprehension. 
Marasco, in no way, supports a conclusion of insufficiency 
in the instant case. 
The defendant has contended that since he was not 
identified at the scene of the commission of the crime 
that identity is lacking. The State contends that the facts 
surrounding the commission of the crime, when coupled 
with other circumstances connecting the defendant to the 
crime, clearly support a reasonable inference identifying 
the defendant. 
In Hardin v. State, 65 Okla. Cr. 260, 85 P. 2d 332 
(1939), the Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma had 
before it a case similar to that now before the Court. The 
court noted : 
"While John Phillips was at the store with A. G. 
Lamb one night two parties came into the store 
and robbed Lamb of some money and a pistol. 
Neither the prosecuting witness or John Phillips 
could recognize the defendant as being one of the 
parties that took part in the robbery. A car was 
seen near the scene of the robbery after the parties 
left the store, and before John Phillips and A. G. 
Lamb got themselves released where the robbers 
had tied them the car was driven away. 
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* * * 
''All of the evidence against the defendant * 
is circumstantial.'' 
* * 
The only evidence identifying the accused was that he 
pawned the pistol taken during the robbery. In addition, 
a less positive identification of the get-away car was ob-
tained, which did not directly connect the defendant. The 
court further noted : 
''The only circumstances upon which the state 
relies to convict the defendant are the circum-
stances that on the 22nd or 23rd of December, 
1935, after the robbery is alleged to have taken 
place on December 6th, 1935, the defendant pawned 
a pistol that was taken from the Lamb store to 
Mrs. Bessie Templin, the witness who testified to 
seeing the defendant leave her place with Tom 
Carrick and Marvin Ward the afternoon or eve-
ning of December 6th, 1935.'' 
The defendant had set up alibi or at least non presence 
similar to the instant case. The Oklahoma Court upheld 
the conviction, noting : 
"Where there is evidence from which the jury 
would reasonably and logically find the defendant 
guilty of the crime charged, in the absence of 
unusual circumstances, this court will not set aside 
the jury's verdict on account of insufficiency of the 
evidence. * * * 
''The evidence IS sufficient to sustain the 
judgment.'' 
It is submitted, therefore, that no merit exists to the 
contention that the evidence was insufficient to sustain 
the conviction. 
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POINT II. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN GIVING IN-
STRUCTION NO. 4 AND THE DEFENDANT 
HAS WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO COMPLAIN 
BY HIS FAILURE TO EXCEPT TO THE 
INSTRUCTION. 
The defendant contends that the Trial Court erred in 
giving Instruction Number 4 in which the court defined a 
person who aids or abets the commission of a crime as a 
principal. At the outset it should be noted that the de-
fendant was represented by counsel at the trial and no 
exception was taken to the instruction now sought to be 
challenged on appeal. 77-37-1, U.C.A. 1953, provides that 
exceptions to instructions shall be ''taken and preserved 
as in civil cases.'' The general rule is said to preclude a 
review of instructions unless an exception has preserved 
the contention for review on appeal. Thus it is noted in 
Abbott, Criminal Trial Practice, 4th Ed., Sec. 672: 
''The correctness of instructions given or refused 
cannot be questioned in the appellate court unless 
a timely exception was saved in the trial 
court * * *." 
The Utah cases have given force to this rule. In State v. 
Smith, 45 Utah 381, 146 Pac. 286 (1915), it was said: 
''So it would require hard struggling to defend 
and support portions of the charge, both as to 
substance and consistency * * *. But there is no 
exception, no assignment, and no claim made as 
to this nor to any portion of the charge. We thus 
leave that." 
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In State v. Ferguson, 83 Utah 357, 28 P. 2d 175 
(1934), it was said: 
''Other errors are assigned to instructions given 
to the jury, but, as no exceptions thereto appear 
of record, they, of course cannot be considered.'' 
Subsequent decisions have modified the strict excep-
tion rule noted above. Thus, in State v. Cobo, 90 Utah 89, 
60 P. 2d 952 (1936), it was said: 
"We wish not to depart from the rule laid down 
in this jurisdiction that in ordinary cases on a p-
peal errors relating to instructions or refusing 
requests to instruct will not be considered or re-
viewed unless exceptions thereto were properly 
taken by the party complaining. But in capital 
cases and in cases of grave and serious charged 
offenses and convictions of long terms of imprison-
ment, cases involving the life and liberty of the 
citizen, we think that when palpable error is made 
to appear on the face of the record and to the mani-
fest prejudice of the accused, the court has the 
power to notice such error and to correct the same, 
though no formal exception was taken to the 
ruling. * * * '' 
Subsequent cases have also given recognition to the pos-
sible exception. Sta.te v. Peterson, 121 Utah 229, 240 P. 
2d 504; Sta.te v. Hines, 6 U. 2d 126, 307 P. 2d 887 (1957). 
The precedent, therefore, will excuse the failure to take 
an exception if the error is palpable and so flagrant as 
to deny a fair trial. 1 
1 77-42-1, U. C. A. 1953, provides that even if error is committed 
it will not be presumed to have affected the substantial rights of 
the accused. 
10 
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Viewing the present instruction against the defend-
ant's claim, it appears that no error was committed, and 
even if a more articulate instruction could have been 
given, the instruction in the instant case in no way de-
prived the defendant of a fair trial. The evidence clearly 
discloses the need for such an instruction since the activi-
ties of the defendant were of the nature of an accomplice. 
He aided Witchey by driving the car, and keeping lookout. 
Such activities appear clearly to be those of the accessory 
to the assault since he did not himself directly assault 
the Eatchels. In addition, the defendant testified him-
self that he procured the car used in the crime. Although 
defendant has noted that in State v. Marasco, supra, that 
the court indicated that inconsistent evidence brought 
out by an accused in support of alibi could not be used to 
bolster the prosecution's case, the evidence in the instant 
case relating to the procuring of the vehicle was not part 
of the defendant's alibi nor in any manner inconsistent 
with the defendant's theory of the case or the prosecu-
tion's. It would appear, therefore, that the instruction 
was entirely proper. 
Defendant contends that the trial judge failed to de-
fine the terms "aid and abet" and that this is, therefore, 
error. This overlooks the direct evidence of record to the 
contrary (R. 61, 77), and hence this contention is un-
meritorious. 
Finally, the defendant contends such an instruction 
was error because the defendant was not charged as an 
aider or abettor. The defendant correctly notes that one 
11 
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who aids and abets in a crime is a principal under Utah 
law, 76-1-44, U.C.A. 1953, but apparently feels that de-
fendant could not be such in the instant case because he 
was not so charged, and relies upon Bta.te v. Bawm, 47 
Utah 7, 151 Pac. 518 (1915), where the court noted the 
defendant was charged directly as a principal. State v. 
Baum is not good precedent for the claim since it was 
decided in 1915 prior to the enactment of 77-21-39, U.C.A. 
1953, which became law in 1935, and provides : 
'' ( 1) Every person concerned in the commission of 
an offense, whether he directly commits the offense 
or procures, counsels, aids, or abets in its com-
mission even though not present shall be informed 
against or indicted and tried and punished as a 
principal. 
'' ( 2) No other facts need be alleged in an informa-
tion or indictment against an accused for procur-
ing, counseling, aiding, or abetting the commission 
of the offense than are required in an information 
or indictment against the person directly commit-
ting the act constituting the offense.'' 
Thus it was proper to charge the defendant in terms of a 
direct principal although the evidence shows him to act 
as an aider. In fact, had the unnecessary aider language 
been used it would have been mere surplusage. 77-21-42, 
U.C.A.1953. 
Under these circumstances, it does not appear that 
the defendant's contention is meritorious since: (1) no 
exception to the charge was taken and the charge as 
given would not deprive the accused of a fair trial; (2) 
the instruction was proper under the evidence ; ( 3) the 
12 
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instruction was proper as to the manner with which the 
accused was charged. 
PoiNT III. 
THE RECORD DOES NOT SHOW THAT THE 
INFORMATION RELATING TO THE HA-
BITUAL CRIMINAL CHARGE WAS READ 
TO THE JURY BEFORE THE ROBBERY 
TRIAL. 
The defendant contends that at his trial on the assault 
with intent to commit robbery charge, the information 
containing that charge and the habitual criminal charge 
was read to the jury, and that this was error. The record 
does not reflect a verbatim description of the actual read-
ing. The record discloses the following entry made by 
the reporter (R. 15) : 
'' * * * The Clerk read the information filed by the 
District Attorney in said case * * *.'' 
This is the complete record on the matter. From this ex-
cerpt the defendant contends the whole information was 
read; the State submits it was not. The only case that 
was then before the jury was the assault with intent to 
commit robbery; therefore, the words "said case" apply 
equally as well to support an inference that only that 
part of the information relating to the robbery was read. 
Three factors support this conclusion: First, certain pen 
marks on the information are susceptible to an inference 
that the clerk marked the second count so that it would 
not be read (R. 8). Secondly, no objection was voiced 
by counsel and hence we may conclude that no impro-
13 
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priety took place. Third, the record reflects that after the 
conviction on the robbery aspect of the case, the Judge 
explained to the jury that there was an additional phase 
to be considered, and the clerk read the information to the 
jury concerning the habitual criminal charge (R. 67). All 
of these factors support an inference that at the time of 
trial on the robbery issue the habitual criminal count was 
not brought before the jury. The record on the matter is 
really not clear, and the inferences are more supportive 
of a conclusion that the habitual criminal count was not 
read than that it was. 
Under such circumstances, a presumption of regu-
larity arises. Abbott, Criminal Trial Practice, 4th Ed., 
Sec. 362. The great weight of authority is to the effect 
that in the absence of a clear showing to the contrary, it 
will be presumed that judicial proceedings were regular 
in all respects. People v. Gazelle, 299 TIL 58, 132 N.E. 
273 (1921). Thus, it is said in 1 Wharton's Criminal Evi-
dence, Sec. 126 : 
''It is rebuttably presumed that the various phases 
of a criminal prosecution have conformed to the 
requirements of the law. * * * 
''All judicial proceedings in courts of general jur-
isdiction are presumed to be correct and regular, 
in the absence of proof to the contrary. * * *" 
"Irregularities or error in the proceedings of 
courts are never presumed, but must be affirma-
tively shown.'' (Emphasis supplied) 
There is no affirmative showing that the second por-
tion of the information relating to the habitual criminal 
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charge was in fact read to the jury before the proper time. 
The inferences are to the contrary and the presumption of 
regularity overcomes any inference that error was 
committed. 
In addition, the State contends that even if the infor-
mation relating to the charge of being an habitual crim-
inal was read, that the defendant cannot now complain 
because he raised no objection and proceeded to trial and 
judgment without raising any protest. Certainly, under 
such circumstances, where defendant was. represented by 
experienced counsel, and knowing of possible error pro-
ceeds to trial, when timely objection could have possibly 
corrected the matter, the defendant must be deemed to 
have waived any objection or be estopped. 
Finally, it is submitted that under the circumstances 
it could not have prejudiced the defendant even if such 
occurred since during the trial the defendant took the 
stand and on cross-examination admitted the convictions 
(R. 50, 56), which would have been read to the jury. 
In State v. Dodge, No. 9500, Nov. 1, 1961, a similar 
objection of prejudice was raised by a claim that an unso-
licited answer of a witness disclosed previous crimes of 
the accuseds. The court noted that on cross-examination 
the accuseds admitted their convictions and said : 
''Also, on cross-examination of appellants both ad-
mitted that they had been previously convicted of 
felonies. Under such circumstances it is apparent 
that the harm, if any, this statement could have 
caused appellants was insufficient to warrant a 
granting of a motion for a mistrial.'' 
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Certainly, in the instant case, where no objection was 
raised, and subsequently the jury had before it similar 
disclosures, even if the full information had been read, 
it could not have prejudiced the defendant. 
It is submitted that there is no basis for a claim of 
error based upon an improper disclosure of the habitual 
criminal information. 
PoiNT IV. 
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE DEFEND-
ANT'S CONVICTIONS UPON THE CHARGE 
OF BEING AN HABITUAL CRIMINAL. 
The defendant finally contends that the trial court 
erred in admitting Exhibits 3 and 4 without foundation to 
further identify them with the accused. The nature of 
the defendant's contention, however, is unclear since the 
substance of his argument seems to go not only to the 
issue of admissibility but to the sufficiency of the evidence 
to sustain the conviction. 
Exhibit 4 is a certified copy of the information and 
commitment for the crime of forgery in violation of 
76-26-1, U.C.A. 1953, upon which a plea of guilty was en-
tered on January 25, 1957, in the District Court of Salt 
Lake County. Exhibit 3 was an exemplified copy of a 
conviction and judgment for armed robbery on January 
12, 1953 in the State of Idaho. The objection of the trial 
defense counsel was only upon the theory that they were 
not "the best evidence." No objection was raised that 
insufficient foundation was laid or lack of identity. The 
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objection was specific, and therefore, if it was not well 
taken, the failure to raise an otherwise proper objection 
will not overturn the case on appeal. Kroger Grocery & 
Baking Co. v. Ha.rpole, 175 Miss. 227, 166 So. 335 (1936). 
Thus, McCormick, Evidence, p. 117, notes : 
"Similarly, the overruling of an objection based 
on an untenable ground, will not be overturned on 
appeal on the basis that there was a tenable 
ground for exclusion which could have been 
urged.'' 
In 23A C. J. S., Criminal Law, Sec. 1963, it is said: 
''Accordingly, an objection to evidence on spe-
cific ground will not raise the objection that it is 
inadmissible on any ground other than that speci-
fied, since if the particular objection assigned is 
not apt, the court will not be put in error for over-
ruling it, although the evidence may be subject to 
other objections." 
The Utah Court has also adopted the requirement 
that an objection on a specific ground, not proper, will 
not suffice to exclude evidence and preserve the appeal 
where another ground, had it been urged, would have been 
proper. State v. Musser, 110 Utah 534, 558, 175 P. 2d 725 
(1947). Therefore, unless the objection based upon the 
"best evidence rule" is proper, the defendant may not 
now claim error to admit the exhibits if otherwise 
relevant. 
In the instant case what was sought to be proved was 
a previous conviction. Although some other evidence 
rather than the record of conviction might be more per-
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suasive, this is not grounds for the best evidence 
objection. The best evidence rule is applicable where the 
thing to be proved is the contents of a writing. In M c-
Cormick, Evidence, p. 409, et seq, it is noted: 
''The specific tenor of this requirement needs to 
be definitely stated and its limits clearly under-
stood. The rule is this: in proving the terms of a 
writing, where such terms are material, the origi-
nal writing must be produced, unless it is shown 
to be unavailable for some reason other than the 
serious fault of the proponent. * * * '' 
In the instant case the Court was concerned not with 
the proof of the contents of any writing, but with proof 
of a conviction which happened to be recorded. See 
76-1-18, U. C. A. 1953. Under these circumstances, the 
"best evidence" rule was in no way applicable. If the 
defendant had felt that identity evidence should be ad-
mitted first, the objection should have been to lack of 
foundation or authentication. The specific objection made 
by defense counsel was, therefore, error, and the matter is 
not preserved for appeal. 
Even if we assume that the objection made was suf-
ficient to preserve the admissibility issue for appeal, the 
defendant's contention is still unmeritorious. The rec-
ords of conviction were properly authenticated in the 
instant case and, therefore, admissible, if relevant. The 
records were public records, and were properly certified 
by the custodian and hence admissible. Richfield v. Cot-
tonwood Irr. Co., 84 Utah 107, 34 P. 2d 945 (1934); Tal-
bot v. Seeman, 1 Cranch 1 (1801); see also Rule 44, 
U.R.C.P. 
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The defendant's major contention as to the admissi-
bility of the exhibits is the claim that there was insuffi-
cient showing to connect them with the defendant. The 
defendant, in this regard, relies upon State v. Bruno, 69 
Utah 444, 256 Pac. 109 (1927). The defendant contends 
that this decision requires more than a mere showing of 
similarity of names. The defendant has confused the rule 
of the Bruno case, since it in no way deals with the ques-
tion of admissibility, but, rather, goes to the weight to be 
given a showing of similarity of names. At this point it 
is sufficient to point out that two properly authenticated 
documents showing that a Max Leon Reay had been con-
victed of felonies and committed were proffered. The 
defendant is also named Max Leon Reay, and the charge 
is habitual criminality. It appears clear that the docu-
ments were, therefore, admissible. State v. Payne, 223 
Mo. 112, 122 S.W. 1062 (1909); State v. Keely, 52 Wash. 
2d 676, 328 P. 2d 362; Brown v. People, 124 Colo. 412, 238 
P. 2d 847. The defendant has contended that the simi-
larity of names was not sufficient to allow the exhibits to 
be admitted. Neither, State v. Aime, 62 Utah 476, 220 Pac. 
704 (1923) nor Sta.te v. Bruno, 69 Utah 444, 256 Pac. 109 
(1927), support the defendant's contention. Since defend-
ant has also attacked the sufficiency of the evidence based 
upon a lack of identity, an analysis of these cases will dis-
close the lack of merit in the defendant's argument. First, 
it should be remembered that neither the Bruno case nor 
the Aime case dealt with the evidentiary problem of ad-
missibility of records of conviction, but rather, both cases 
were concerned with substantive problems. 
19 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In Aime, the defendant contended that the evidence 
of a previous conviction was insufficient for the purposes 
of sustaining an increased verdict in a liquor possession 
case. The court noted: 
''The matter of identity was submitted to the jury 
as a fact to be determined by them from the evi-
dence, under the usual instructions, and a verdict 
of guilty as charged was returned." 
The court further noted that: 
''The proof consisted of the record of the previous 
conviction of John Aime, in the justice's court of 
the precinct where the defendant resided, of the 
offense of manufacturing intoxicating liquor. No 
additional evidence was offered to show the iden-
tity of defendant and the person described in the 
record of conviction.'' 
The court held the evidence sufficient to sustain the con-
viction, and in so doing, noted : 
"It is a general rule that identity of names IS 
prima facie evidence of identity of persons.'' 
Subsequently, in State v. Bruno, 69 Utah 444, 256 
Pac. 109 (1927), the defendant, Mary Bruno, challenged a 
persistent violator conviction of the prohibition law. The 
only evidence introduced was records of previous convic-
tions showing that one Mary Bruno had been convicted. 
The error found by the Supreme Court was not in the 
admissibility of the records nor in their sufficiency, but 
rather an instruction by the judge that the records con-
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elusively showed her conviction and that the jury must 
regard that as prima facie evidence. The court noted the 
Aime case and said : 
''The Aime case is authority for submitting to the 
jury in this case, with proper instructions, the 
question of whether or not Mary Bruno who plead-
ed guilty to having intoxicating liquor in her pos-
session as shown by the records of the city court 
which were received in evidence. There is, how-
ever, a vast difference between holding that evi-
dence is sufficient to sustmin a verdict and holding 
that as a matter of law a given fact is established.'' 
(Emphasis supplied) 
The court held that since the instruction took from 
the jury their prerogative to find the facts, that it was 
error. Neither Aime nor Bruno hold that identity of 
names is not sufficient to admit records of previous con-
viction, nor that based upon such identity and records a 
jury may not find the defendant guilty. In fact, both 
cases seem to support a conclusion that this is at least 
sufficient to put the matter before the jury, and where de-
fendant offers no rebuttal, that a conviction may be 
sustained. 2 Although there is some weight to the con-
trary, it would appear that the greater majority of cases 
support the rule that identity of name is at least sufficient 
to make out a prima facie case. 11 ALR 2d 870; People 
Y. Crawford, 128 CA 2d 699, 275 P. 2d 931 (Cal.); People 
v. Ahouse, 162 CA 2d 586,328 P. 2d 227; Jenkins v. United 
2 Although the annotation in 11 ALR 2d 870 seems to find a con-
flict between Aime and Bruno, this is a failure of the author to 
comprehend the Bruno decision. 
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Sta.tes, 146 A. 2d 444; Jordan v. State, 218 Miss. 337, 67 
So. 2d 371; State v. Wycoff, 27 N.J. Super 322, 99 A. 2d 
365; Jackson v. State, 308 P. 2d 323 (Okla.); State v. Reed, 
298 S.W. 2d 426, (Mo.). It appears that California and 
Missouri have both changed their former positions to one 
supporting a conviction on the basis of identity of names. 
People v. Clinesmith, 175 CA 2d Supp. 911,346 P. 2d 923; 
State v. Romprey, 399 S.W. 2d 746 (Mo.). It is submitted, 
therefore, that the evidence introduced, being unrebutted, 
is sufficient to sustain the conviction. 
In addition, it is noted that there is additional sup-
portive evidence of record. The defendant took the stand 
on the robbery charge, and there admitted the crimes, 
dates and places that were the subject of the habitual 
criminal charge (R. 50, 56). Under such circumstances, 
the jury had before it the admission of the accused him-
self of his convictions and identity therewith. Under 
these circumstances the accused's admission, plus the cer-
tified prior convictions, are more than sufficient to sustain 
the conviction for being an habitual criminal. 11 ALR 2d 
870, 875, 876. State v. Grah(JfJn, 172 Kan. 627, 242 P. 2d 
1067; People v. Herod, 112 CA 2d 764,247 P. 2d 127. 
The defendant's contention that the admissions made 
during the robbery charge may not be carried over to the 
habitual charge overlooks the general weight of authority 
to the contrary. See cases collected 11 ALR 2d 875. It 
also fails to comprehend the nature of the habitual crimi-
nal charge. This charge is not a crime, but a status ; it is 
not presented to the jury during the principal charge, 
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since conviction upon the principal charge is a prerequi-
site to consideration of the habitual status. The same jury 
is used, 76-1-19, U.C.A. 1953, with two charges being con-
sidered, but only one trial. State v. Rassum, 107 Utah 94, 
152 P. 2d 88; State v. Stewart, 110 Utah 203, 171 P. 2d 
383. Since it is a status, not a crime, the accused is charged 
with, and the same jury is involved, it would seem an 
unnecessary formality to refuse to consider evidence of 
which the jury is already possessed. 3 
It is noted that in State v. Wood, 2 U. 2d 34, 268 P. 2d 
998 (1954), that the defendant contended that it was error 
to allow him to be impeached by showing prior convic-
tions at the time of the principal charge, since this, it 
was said, was evidence of his crimes tending to prove the 
habitual criminal charge. The court did not say that the 
impeaching evidence could not be used to support the 
conviction; it merely said impeachment was still allow-
able, that the State still bore the burden of proof, and 
then noted: 
"It is to be noted that the state did not rely on 
appellant's single admission of conviction, but 
introduced proof by way of court records." (Em-
phasis supplied) 
The court thus sustained the habitual criminal conviction 
on the basis of the same evidence now before the Court. 
It is also noted that in State v. Zeimer, 10 U. 2d 45, 
347 P. 2d 1111 (1960), the Court held that the habitual 
3 It is submitted that to hold to the contrary would duplicate evi-
dence and thus to "march the King's troops up the hill in order 
to march them down the hill." 
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criminal portion of the trial is severable from the main 
charge for the purpose of granting a new trial, so that 
a new trial could be granted on the habitual criminal 
charge alone. However, the Court was there clear to 
note that the habitual criminal charge was not for a crime 
but as to a status. There is nothing in the Zeimer case 
to preclude using admissions made by the accused on the 
main charge before the same jury to prove the habitual 
charge. 
It is submitted, therefore, that defendant's conten-
tion is unmeritorious since (1) improper .objection was 
made at the trial to the admission of Exhibits 3 and 4, and 
he may not now complain; (2) the exhibits were properly 
admitted; (3) the defendant's identity was sufficiently 
shown by similarity of names so as to make out a prima 
f~cie case upon which the jury could convict; ( 4) the 
defendant's admissions support defendant's guilt on the 
habitual criminal charge. 
CONCLUSION 
The defendant has suggested various alternative 
forms of relief. It is submitted the defendant is entitled 
to none of these requesets. The defendant's conviction 
on the charge of assault with the intent to commit robbery 
is fully sustained by the evidence, and no instructional or 
other errors appear of record. The evidence amply sup-
ports the conviction of the defendant on the charge of 
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being a habitual criminal.4 Therefore, the Court should 
affirm both convictions. 
4 If error were committed as to the habitual criminal charge, reversal of 
only that portion of the charge WOlflld be warranted. State v. Zeimer, 
supra. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WALTER L. BUDGE 
Attorney General 
RONALD N. BOYCE 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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